

Cryptography

Intro to Crypto

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```
import pwn

pwn.context.arch = "amd64"
pwn.context.os = "linux"

SHELLCODE = pwn.shellcraft.amd64.linux.echo('Test') + pwn.shellcraft
EXPLOIT = 0x45*b"\x90" + pwn.asm(SHELLCODE, arch="amd64", os="linux")

PROGRAM = b""
length = 20 + 16
for i in EXPLOIT:
    PROGRAM += i*b'+' + b'>'

    if i == 1:
        length += 5
    elif i > 1:
        length += 6
    length+= 13

    (0x8000 - length) > 0x40:
        PROGRAM += b"<>"
        length += 2*13

    b"["
    3

    (9 - length) + 7 -1

    F+0x10)*b"<"

(host", 1337) as conn:
    (b"Brainf*ck code: ")
    PROGRAM)
    e()
```

Why?

Security Goals

- **Confidentiality:** Protecting personal data
- **Integrity:** Data has not been modified
- **Authenticity:** Exactly what is claimed

Classical Cryptography

Caesar cipher

- Each letter is shifted by a fixed value K
- $encrypt_K(P) = (P + K) \bmod 26$
- $decrypt_K(C) = (C - K) \bmod 26$

Example for $K = 23$:

Plaintext:	T	H	E	Q	U	I	C	K	B	R	O	W	N	F	O	X	...
Ciphertext:	Q	E	B	N	R	F	Z	H	Y	O	L	T	K	C	L	U	...

Classical Cryptography

Vigenère cipher

- Choose a key of multiple letters, shift each letter according to the key letter
- Attacks: Determine key length, frequency analysis, (Kasiski examination)

Example:

Plaintext:	A	T	T	A	C	K	A	T	D	A	W	N
Key:	L	E	M	O	N	L	E	M	O	N	L	E
Ciphertext:	L	X	F	O	P	V	E	F	R	N	H	R

Classical Cryptography

One Time Pad (OTP)

- Use key with same length as plaintext
- **Information-theoretically secure**, if key is chosen equally distributed at random and used only once
- Key exchange needs to be done separately via a secure channel
- Mostly not realizable

Randomness

- In most programming languages default pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) are not cryptographically secure
 - ⇒ State can be recovered
- Cryptographically Secure RNGs:
 - getrandom
 - Hardware RNGs
 - RNGs of the cryptographic libraries (e.g., secrets or Crypto.Random in python)

Symmetric Cryptography

Stream Ciphers

- Pseudo-random key stream generated from key with an PRNG
- Key stream is XORed with plaintext stream
- Examples: RC4, SEAL, Salsa, CryptMT
- Attacks:
 - Known Plaintext: Calculate parts of the key stream when parts of plaintext are known
 - Key Reuse: Two messages are encrypted with same key stream, difference (XOR) between plaintexts is observable

Symmetric Cryptography

Block Ciphers

- Encrypt blocks of fixed length
- Padding: Extend messages to full block length
- Examples: DES, IDEA, RC5, AES, Blowfish, ...
- Modes Of Operation: (e.g. ECB, CBC, CTR, GCM)
- Attacks:
 - Against Cipher: Differential or linear cryptanalysis
 - Different Attacks against different modes of operation

RSA - Key Generation

- Choose large prime numbers p and q
- Calculate the modulus $N = p * q$
- Calculate $\phi(N) = (p - 1) * (q - 1)$
- Choose e with $\gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1 \wedge 1 < e < \phi(N)$
- Calculate d as inverse of e under modulus $\phi(N)$

$$e * d \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(N)}$$

- Public Key: N, e
- Private Key: d

RSA - Encryption and Decryption

- Encryption: $c = m^e \bmod N$
- Decryption: $c^d = (m^e)^d = m^{ed} \bmod \phi(N) = m^1 \bmod N$
- RSA without special padding is homomorphic
($Enc(m_1, pk) * Enc(m_2, pk) = Enc(m_1 * m_2, pk)$) and deterministic
- Use RSA-OAEP if that is problematic

RSA - Attacks

- Factoring N is infeasible for reasonable choice of N
- In some cases, attacks in polynomial time possible:
 - Small private exponent d ($d < \frac{1}{3} N^{\frac{1}{4}}$): Wiener's attack
 - For small public exponent or partially known prime factor: Coppersmith's attack
 - $m < N^{\frac{1}{e}}$: calculate message as root of ciphertext
 - Message sent to many recipients using same public exponent: Hastad's Broadcast Attack

Elliptic Curves

- Elliptic Curve Equation:
- Group: Generator point G , point addition and multiplication with natural number
- Cyclic EC group over $\mathbb{Z}_p, p > 3$
- Point (x, y) on curve iff $y^2 \equiv x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$, plus (imaginary) point at infinity
 $O, a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ with $4a^3 + 27b^2 \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$
- Harder to attack, can use smaller keys for same security level

ECC - Common Problems

- Bad curves or parameters
- Bad (P)RNG
- Nonce reuse

Typical Cryptography Vulnerabilities

- Implementation Mistake: Incorrect/vulnerable custom implementation, incorporated incorrectly into application
- Conceptual Mistake: Incorrect use or not sufficient for use case
- Theoretic Mistake: Violated condition for security, advanced maths or theoretic computer science necessary, "read the paper"
- Well-known and documented attacks (e.g. length extension attack)
- Oracles

Tools

- CyberChef
- <https://factordb.com/>
- **sagemath** (free open-source mathematics software system)
- **Z3** (theorem prover)

Further Topics

- Post-Quantum Cryptography
- Pairing-Based Cryptography
- Zero Knowledge

Start Playing Crypto CTF

- <https://intro.kitctf.de/>
- Other Platforms:
 - <https://cryptohack.org/> (Easy to hard, with good explanations)
 - <https://cryptopals.com/> (Implement cryptosystems and attacks)
 - <https://overthewire.org/wargames/krypton> (Classical crypto)
 - <https://imaginaryctf.org/> (Not only crypto but also other CTF challenges)